Executive compensation is designed to create incentives for CEOs to act in the best interest of shareholders. Short-term (bonus) and equity-based incentives induce risk taking behaviors of the CEO that could further change a firm's risk exposure. This article examines the linkage between compensation components and the impacts on a firm's credit risk using data from the U.S. and Germany. In the U.S., we find a positive relation between equity-based compensation and credit default swap spreads. Similar positive relation is also found between short-term incentive bonus pay suggesting compensation infuce more risk taking for the U.S. firms. However, we do not find significantly positive relation between equity-based incentive and a firm's credit risk in German firms. Our results seem to indicate that bonus pay is large portion of pay for German CEOs therefore restraint CEOs' risk taking strategies.
Introduction
Agency problem has been examined extensively in finance literature and was found to affect corporate function in great deal (Holmstrom 1979) . In modern business world, ownership of a firm is usually separate from management. These arrangements further induce mismatching incentives from owners and managers. Empire building and excessive perquisite consumptions are examples of executive personal interests from prior literature (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Amihud and Lev 1981) that will not maximize shareholders wealth. Several mechanisms have evolved to solve agency problem in modern corporate world, i.e. takeover threat, board of director monitoring system and executive pay package.
Executive compensation is designed to align corporate agents' (CEOs and other executives) incentives with those of its owners (shareholders). CEO pay is typically composed by fixed salary, bonus, stocks granted, options granted and long term incentive plans. Some compensation pay is more performance based (i.e. bonus) and others are used to make CEOs shareholders themselves (equity based incentives). A certain change in the compensation structure is likely to change executives' incentives and alter their behaviors, particularly in risk-taking and shifting strategies. Changing strategies leads to settings of capital structure, usage of debts and eventually increase/decrease bankruptcy risk exposures for a company.
This article examines the linkage between compensation components and the impacts on a firm's credit risk. Few studies have examined the relation between CEO ownership/compensation and bond returns or credit risk (Carlson and Lazrak 2009 ). However, almost all studies focus on the U.S. firms. We examine the relations of compensation and firms credit risks in two very distinct markets: U.S. and Germany. We are also particularly interested in performance based and equity based compensation and their impacts on a firm's risk exposure.
Germany and the U.S. markets are the classic representatives of divergent financial systems. Thus, the German financial system is seen, in particular, as a classic example of a bank based and control oriented financial system. Whereas the U.S. market, on the other hand, is regarded as a traditional representative of a market oriented financial system (see Allen and Gale (1995) ). A central role in the discussion of financial systems is played by the different kind of relationships between companies and banks and the resulting scope and extent of informational advantage. In countries of the bank oriented type like Germany long-term customer bank relations are the norm, while in market oriented countries like the U.S., a less intensive relation between company and bank is evident. The fundamental difference between the corporate governance systems in Germany and the U.S. is referred to as an `insider versus outsider system´ in the literature.
We choose these two distinct markets to examine compensation structures and the impacts on firms' risk exposure. Is compensation structure comparable worldwide or a countrywide Due to the fact that there are particularly informed participants trading on the CDS market -first and foremost banks -credit risk relevant information can basically appear on the CDS market first. CDS spreads can reflect private information before the information is made public i.e. before these are reflected in the stock prices (see Acharya and Johnson (2005) for evidence on insider trading in CDS markets). Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) claim with regard to price finding on markets: "Price discovery will occur in the market in which informed traders transact most." It is beyond the scope of this study to compare and conclude price discovery of these two markets 1 .
We estimate short term incentive pay (bonus) and equity based pay (stocks and options granted) impact on firms' credit risk. We adopt different econometric models to examine this relationship. In the U.S. data, we find a positive relation between equity based compensation and CDS spread of the firm. The higher the equity based component, the more credit risk a firm is exposed to. We also find a similar positive relation between short-term incentive bonus pay and CDS spread. Short term compensation incentive also increases a firm's credit risk.
On the other hand, German compensation speaks a different language. Equity based compensation is not a significant driver of a firm's credit risk. There exists a negative relation between bonus pay and CDS spread. Bonus is a relative larger component of CEO pay in Germany compared to that in the U.S (See descriptive table) . A large component of German CEO pay is tied to short term incentive. Although there could be limited downside risk for
CEOs to choose risky project, the high proportion of the pay from bonus could restraint 1 Available empirical investigations regarding price leadership have examined the lead-lag relations between the three markets: bonds, stocks and CDS market and not explicitly based on the CDS and stock market (see Forte and Pena (2005), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Norden and Weber (2004) . The study allows one to conclude that the stock markets as well as the CDS market are, regarding information, ahead of the bond market. In two out of three relevant studies mentioned the stock market is, as opposed to the CDS market, price leader. The study by Longstaff, Mithal, Neis (2005) shows no exact price leadership in either of the two markets.
CEOs' risk taking behaviors. This could possibly explain our findings on negative relation between bonus and credit risk; we offer other explanations in our discussion of the results.
Our article contributes to this literature by showing that managerial compensation is a significant determinant of a firm's credit risk in the U.S. However, managerial compensation could speak a different language in Germany and influence a firm's credit risk differently. We organize the paper as the following. In section 2 we discuss the evolvement of CDS market.
We also review prior literature and develop several hypotheses in this section. In section 3 we describe our data. We present empirical analysis in section 4 and conclude in section 5.
CDS Market, Literature and Hypotheses Development

Development of the Credit Derivatives Market
In the mid-nineties new derivative financial instruments for the transfer of credit and credit risks were developed. Figure 1 .
Economically a strong resemblance between Credit Default Swaps and credit insurance is apparent. What differentiates it from default insurance -and enables it to be a specific instrument -is that CDS is traded daily and the spreads reflect the default risk, including the (unsure) recovery rate, of a credit position almost immediately. The CDS market is an OTC market (over-the-counter-market). The players are professional market participants, whereby banks, hedge funds and insurance companies dominate the international market. In the meantime the CDS is, for the well-known companies on the capital market, very liquid.
CDS and bond market are related markets: the prices i.e. spreads of both are influenced by the credit risk of a company; so that information about the credit risk of the company will also be reflected in the prices. Based on the structural differences of the markets, this information can be reflected in the prices with different time delays.
The relation between CDS spreads and bond spreads is the central focus of some empirical studies. The theoretically postulated close connection between the two credit risk premiums is also empirical. (Amato and Remolona 2003) . The CDS market, on the other hand, is the market where credit risks can be traded easiest. CDS offer the possibility of buying or selling credit risks without having to sell or buy the underlying bond. Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) show that a substantial percentage of the credit spread of bonds are determined by liquidity factors. Zhu (2004) discovered in a study that liquidity plays a major role in the explanation of price differences on the bond-and CDS market. CDS are, meanwhile -because of the comparably high liquidity -the preferred instruments of the arbitrage dealers to implement their strategies.
An important point with the evaluation of credit spreads with bonds is identifying the correct risk free interest rates. The suitable riskless interest rates are, according to recent research, no longer government yield bonds but rather swap rates. While with corporate bond spreads above the benchmark risk free interest rate estimates have to be made, in the case of CDS spreads the `true´ credit spread is already reflected. The CDS market is the market which reflects the credit risks of a reference entity most reliably, whereas in the bond market irregularities appear.
The CDS market is also the market where credit risks can be traded simply and without restrictions. In empirical papers the question which of the two markets is price leader has already been discussed. The presently available empirical evidence (Blanco, Brennan and Marsh 2005, Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) , Norden and Weber (2004) as well as Zhu (2004) implies that the CDS market displays price leadership when compared with the bond market and that it is more efficient in pricing. Accordingly, the CDS market is, meanwhile, the leading credit risk market and shows the development of the credit quality of debtors early on.
Related Research and Hypotheses Development
In Merton's 1976 seminal paper, the value of a corporate debt depends on three items: the required return on riskless debt, the provisions contained in the indenture, and the probability that the firm will be unable to satisfy some or all indenture requirements. Credit risk is particularly related to the probability of default that is a function of the volatility of a firm's operations.
It has long been described in Holmstrom (1979) that principal-agent relations are prevalent in economic organizations. A problem of moral hazard may arise when an individual agent engage in risk sharing under conditions those actions taken privately will affect the outcome. The source of this moral hazard problem is due to asymmetric information among individuals and actions taken by these individuals cannot be observed and contracted upon. Through the mechanism of executive compensation, firms may be able to decrease the level of agency problem and align manager personal interests with shareholders wealth 3 .
Several studies have examined compensation structure and its impacts on managerial firm risk management. Tufano (1996) , Smith and Stulz (1985) , and Stulz (1984) discuss managerial risk aversion as a driver of corporate risk management. Managers whose human capital and wealth are poorly diversified strongly prefer to reduce the risk to which they are exposed. Model of Smith and Stulz suggests that managers with greater stock ownership prefer more risk management, while those with greater option holdings prefer less risk management. Stocks provide linear payoffs whereas options provide convex payoffs.
Tufano ( 1996) examines the corporate risk management activities in gold mining industry.
This study confirms the finance theory predicted by Smith and Stulz (1985) that firms manage less gold price risk when managers hold more stock options. Firms whose managers have more wealth invested in the firm's stock manage more gold price risk.
Compensation could include performance sensitive or/and performance insensitive components. Murphy (1999) has documented the rapid growth of equity-based compensation The sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price, or delta, is seen as aligning managers' incentives with shareholders incentives (Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2006). High delta will lead to hard working CEOs and more aligned shareholders interest with respect to risk taking behavior. However, high delta could also decrease risk taking if the CEO is extremely undiversified in personal portfolios. Options-based compensation could potentially reduce risk aversion to risky yet positive NPV projects given the convex payoffs.
However, based on special features of the package it also provides managers different incentives for risk taking. This may leads to a change in companies'risk profile. We survey in the following of lieterature on agency problem and excutive compensation to develop testable hypothese.
Equity-based executive compensation may mitigate these conflicts of interest by providing a more direct link between manager and shareholder wealth. However, contracting theory predicts that greater equity-related compensation may exacerbate the agency problems of debt (Bryan etal 2006) . Benston and Evan (2006) studies banks CEO ownership structure and suggests that CEOs who are not significant stockholders generally will avoid taking actions that shift risk to debtholders. Unlike limited-liability stockholders (who can lose only the funds invested in their shares), the expected value of high-risk projects for these CEOs generally is negative.
Several forms of incentive based compensation could be used to align the interests of CEOs with that of shareholders (to give incentives for risk taking or risk shifting). They postulate that short-term incentives (bonuses) may be more effective than long-term incentives (stock options and rights and non-stock-related long-term incentive pay) as an incentive for CEOs to shift risk to debt holders. Bonuses are linked with accounting measures. They can be "manipulated" and so there is no (or no early) negative consequence. CEO gets bonus, even when the firms fails later (see also Noe et et al. 1996) . Stock options offer the possibility of greater rewards should the risks taken succeed.
In a study that examines the role of corporate governance in the 2007-2008 credit crisis, Erkens, Hung and Matos (2009) hypothesize that CEO bonus pay is associated with larger losses during the crisis and more risk taking before the crisis. Equity-based compensation is associated with smaller losses and less risk taking. They define equity-based compensation as the sum of restricted shares, long-term incentive plans (LTIP), and stock option awards scaled by the sum of salary and other annual compensation. Bonus pay is scaled by the sum of salary and other annual compensation.
From the Merton model, it can be derived that investing in risky projects increases the value of the option the shareholders have on a levered firm. This is the asset substitution or risk shifting problem (see also Galai and Masulis (1976) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that when risky debt is outstanding, equity has a convex payoff structure such that shareholders gain by shifting into higher risk projects even when the incremental net present value is negative. Their analysis suggests, that the proportion of equity controlled (owned) should influence the firm´s policies and also leverage and CDSspreads.
However, Bagnani et al suggest that management's stake becomes large, management's and shareholders' interests may become less well aligned for two reasons. First, as management's stake increases, its wealth becomes less well diversified, so management becomes concerned about the undiversifiable risk of its stake. Second, ownership of equity also implies control of votes; as management's stake increases, it can use its control of votes to protect its position. As a result of these conflicting forces, both theoretical models and empirical evidence indicate that greater managerial ownership tends to affect shareholder wealth positively at low levels of ownership and may affect shareholder wealth negatively at higher levels of ownership. In this paper, they find support for the hypothesis that the relation between bondholder returns and managerial ownership is not monotonic; there is no relation between bond returns and ownership for ownership below 5 percent, a positive relation for ownership between 5 and 25 percent, and a weak negative relation for ownership in excess of 25 percent. Past arguments state that managers prefer less risky investments and lower leverage, so they can reduce the uncertainty of their undiversifiable "human capital" investment in the firm (Amihud and Lev (1981) ) and lessen the probability of bankruptcy (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). The managers' interests, therefore, are closer to the interests of bondholders who, like managers, are exposed to the downside risk of negative investment return outcomes and do not share significantly in upside return outcomes. In the absence of any incentive mechanisms, managers would pursue, their own interests by taking low risk projects at the expense of the stockholders and to the general benefit of bondholders. First, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) note that managers' increased nonhuman wealth investment in the firm may become so large as to make them increasingly sensitive to the potentially undiversifiable, nonsystematic risk of the firm. If their human wealth is also relatively job specific, this will reinforce managerial risk aversion at high managerial stake-holding levels. Therefore, the second hypothesis examined in this study is that the relation between corporate bond returns and managerial stockholdings is nonmonotonic. Specifically, at large managerial stockholding levels, the positive relation between bond returns and managerial stockholdings may become weaker or, beyond a certain level, even switch. Based on the literature above, we hypothesise the following:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between equity-based compensation and CDS spreads.
Hypothesis 2:
There is a positive relation between short term incentive pay (bonus) and CDS spreads.
Hypothesis 3:
There is a positive relation between CEO ownership and CDS spreads.
Sample Selection and Data Description
Sample Selection
The primary focus of our study is to examine the impact of CEO compensation of the firm on firm's default risk measured by credit default spreads (CDS). CDS market has become expect to see an inverse relationship, as the lowest default risk measured by rating agencies (highest value 23 in our investigation) should be associated with lower CDS spreads.
Firm specific variables
Structural variables
We have several firm specific respectively control variables in place. Merton's approach (1974) provides a unique insight into the theoretical relationship between equity value, volatility, default probability and credit spreads. From the so called structural models can be derived that CDS spreads are determined by equity market data such as volatility and market leverage. Recent research shows, that these "structural variables" have significant impact on the levels of CDS premiums (see for example Aunon-Nerin et al. 2002 and Ericsson et al. 2004) . From this theory we expect to see a higher CDS spread with higher leverage (proxied with Long term debt to Total Assets) and with higher volatility (our proxy for volatility of a firm's asset is equity standard deviation). In Merton's model the volatility of a firm's assets provides important information about the firms's probability of default. Campbell and Taksler (2003) show that firm level volatility (as well as credit ratings) can explain a large portion of the variation in corporate bond yields. We expect to see that higher volatility (standard deviation) is associated with higher credit risk, e.g. higher CDS spreads.
Size
As a measure of firm size we include the value of total assets. The findings in Carlson and Lazrak (2009) and Das et al. (2007) suggest that there is a negative relationship between firm size and CDS spread meaning that less default risk is inherent in larger firms. One can argue that bigger firms are better diversified than smaller ones and have therefore a less probability of default. The reputation of big companies in the credit/bond markets is higher and they are confronted with less agency costs. (This argument gives also rise to the contrary hypothesis:
if larger firms present less default risk this should lead to a higher lending willingness and to a higher leverage ratio; this in turn should be associated with a higher credit risk, e.g. higher CDS spreads, see also Rajan and Zingales (1995) for further arguments).
Profitability
Profitability is gauged by Return on Assets (ROA), calculated as net income divided by total assets. More profitable firms bear less default risk (better!). The predicted sign between CDS Spreads and ROA is therefore negative (Das et al. (2007) found a strong negative relationship between ROA and CDS spreads).
As a second market based measure of profitability we employ RETURN, calculated as daily stock return over the calendar year. Higher stock returns should be associated with a lower probability of default and therefore lower CDS spreads (Byström 2005 finds that CDS spreads are significantly negatively correlated to contemporaneous stock returns at the index level). Equity/total compensation is the ratio of the sum of options, LTIP, and restricted shares) to total compensation.
Summary statistics
The average CDS spread is lower in the German sample as well as leverage ratio. There is no remarkable difference in average stock returns as well as standard deviation. Average rating is slightly higher for German companies. German firms are on average bigger than U.S. firms in our samples. Profitability measured by return on assets (ROA) is on average higher in U.S. firms. In terms of CEO compensation, Table 2 shows that CEO compensation in Germany is much more tilted towards bonus compensation than in the U.S. The bonus component is on average 50 % of total compensation, in the U.S. only 13 %. This is a distinct difference in compensation structure. The second component of interest, equity compensation does not differ substantially between the two countries.
Empirical Analysis
Econometric Model
Panel data for 418 US firms and 22 German forms for the period 2004 to 2008 were used to explain some of the determinants of CDS spreads and to examine whether CEO compensation structure is related to credit risk. The empirical assessment is based on the basic model given by Equation (1).
ln (spread) it = α + ß 1 rating i,t + ß 2 lratio i,t + ß 3 return i,t + ß 4 stddev i,t + ß 5 ROA i,t + ß 6 ltotalassets i,t + ß 7 compensation variable i,t + εit
where subscript i refers to firms, t refers to years from 2004 to 2008, α is the intercept, and εit is an error term. As described in the data section, six firm specific respectively fundamental variables are applied: credit rating, leverage ratio, stock return, equity standard deviation at the firm level, return on assets and total assets. The compensation variables are the key variables of this study, i.e. (1) the proportion of bonus in total compensation as well as (2) the ratio of equity based compensation to total compensation.
We used several estimation methods. First, we applied pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). Table 3 , columns i-ii, presents the results for the US sample and table 4, columns i-ii, for the German sample for our compensation variables of interest, the bonus and equity component of total compensation. The columns iii and iv in both panels include a year dummy for crisis 2008 (as the CDS spreads rose dramatically in comparison to all other years) and industry dummies. However, modeling the relation in this manner fails to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, or omitted variable bias. It is therefore possible that these results are biased due to multiple occurrences of the omitted variable across time periods. In the presence of unobserved firm effects, firm fixed effects regression is commonly suggested.
We test the validity of the random effects estimator by a Hausman specification test. The test rejects the random effects estimator for both samples and thus the fixed effects models are preferred. The fixed effects regressions explain the variation across time while controlling for firm-specific effects. For example, if the default risk of a particular firm is driven by a bad management, the firm-specific intercept in the fixed effect regression would capture the additional required spread component. The estimates of the fixed effects models are reproduced in columns v and vi in table 3 (US sample) and 4 (German sample).
Empirical Results
U.S. Sample
Our main variables of interest are the compensation components and their influence on credit risk. We hypothesized (Hypothesis 1) that there is a positive relation between equitybased compensation and CDS spreads. It is shown that the proportion of CEO's equity-based compensation clearly matters for credit risk. The coefficients in the regressions are strongly significant with the expected sign. A high level of the equity-based component in compensation drives credit risk and therefore CDS spreads. When CEOs' compensation is aligned with shareholders, they tend to take risky projects due to limited downside risk. This action would lead to an increase in a firm's risk exposure in terms of credit risk. The results clearly argue in favor of hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 established our prediction that there is a positive relation between short term incentive pay (bonus) and CDS spreads. This hypothesis consistently received strong support, both in terms of the sign as well as statistical significance, in all three regressions. It seems that creditors perceive bonuses as incentive to CEOs to invest in risky projects. Debtholders seem to anticipate and price that risk shifting problem and therefore it is reflected in CDS spreads (for a theoretical analysis see Noe et al. (1996) ).
We begin with more detailed discussions of the results of the US sample in Table 3 , which provide a number of valuable insights. As discussed earlier, prior research shows that credit ratings can explain a large portion of the levels of CDS spreads or bond spreads. Credit ratings produced by the major credit rating agencies aim to measure the creditworthiness of companies, i.e. their ability to meet their debt servicing obligations. They measure credit risk and should catch firm specific credit relevant information. We predicted an inverse relationship (due to our conversion procedure) between the variables CDS spread and rating.
In all models, our rating variable has a negative sign and the coefficients are statistically highly significant. This shows that ratings influence CDS spreads significantly.
Merton's (1974) model (and other structural models) can be used to explain risky debt yields. In that models credit spreads depend on leverage and asset volatility. We predicted that our proxies leverage ratio and equity standard deviation are both positively correlated with CDS spreads. As the results in all regressions show these two "structural variables" are indeed a significant determinant of CDS spreads.
Furthermore we find that stock returns are negatively related to CDS spreads. Higher stock returns imply better future prospects and should be associated with lower default risk.
This inverse relationship is shown in all regressions and is statistically highly significant.
Prior research has shown that accounting based measures of profitability and CDS spreads are negatively correlated. More profitable firms bear less credit risk. We expected therefore a negative relationship between ROA and CDS spread. This hypothesis was strongly supported and the coefficients for ROA are positive and statistically significant in all models.
Furthermore we expected to see a negative association between size and credit risk spread.
All in all the results do not support this hypothesis (the fixed effects models show a positive relationship). We also employed sales as a further proxy for size with similar results.
German Sample
We now turn to the results of the German sample. The variable rating shows the expected negative sign but looses significance in the fixed effects models. It can be argued that the information content of Credit ratings of German companies is less and rating agencies measure credit risk better for US located companies. One reason could be that they don't take into account sufficiently the special characteristics in European accounting, disclosure and management practices (see also Engelen (2004)). This could explain why ratings could be not such an important determinant of CDS spreads in the "German market".
Leverage ratio is a significant positive determinant of CDS spreads in the fixed effects models only. Stock return shows predominantly a significant negative relationship with our dependent variable. Equity standard deviation shows no significance in the FE models. Our further firm specific variables ROA and size (measured by total assets) display the expected sign but are not significant.
The hypothesis 1 that higher equity based compensation is associated with higher default risk because of the risk shifting problem is not supported by the results. We had hypothesized (Hypothesis 2) that a higher bonus component in CEO compensation is related with higher CDS spreads. It is interesting to see that the sign is negative in all regressions and significant in the FE model. There seems to be a tendency that creditors approve bonuses. There are several possible explanations for such a tendency. One potential explanation is that bonus pay for German CEOs consist of a large portion of their total compensation (50% on average) compared to U.S. CEOs (13% on average). This high concentration of pay in bonus could restraint CEOs risk taking behavior and leads to a lower credit risk of a firm.
An alternative explanation is that markets are not that efficient in Germany and therefore creditors are not aware of a potential risk shifting problem inherent in short term incentive pay. It could also be that they value bonus payments positive as it reflects (correctly) the profitability of the firm. In the context of the financial system in Germany this could be for reasons of superior or private information. Germany is marked by a high degree of intermediation (linked to monitoring by banks). German universal banks, which are major players in the CDS market have, regarding the traded German companies on the CDS market a potential information advantage. The reason for this can be found in the special role of banks in the German financial system ("relationship banking" or "Hausbankenprinzip").
Potential channels for the generation of information are: direct equity stakes in companies, Supervisory Board members and credit relationships as well as the investment banking relationship.
It is important to note that we were restricted to a small sample for our German panel (due to the lack of compensation data) and that the results have to be interpreted with caution. But they are first evidence that some of the fundamental and well known determinants of CDS spreads are less important for German companies and that compensation structure as well as the influence on CDS spreads is different.
Conclusion
This article examines the linkage between compensation structure and its impacts on firms' credit risk exposure. We provide evidence that some components of the U.S. CEO compensation drive the firm's credit default swap spreads. However, our German data does not find consistent results. This could be due to different portions of the CEO pays that are short-term vs. equity based. We believe this paper is the first international study that examines the relation between compensation and firms' credit risk. We are also planning to examine the relation between CEO ownership and CDS spreads in future steps. Coefficients from pooled regressions of annual CDS spreads on firm characteristics and CEO compensation for 418 U.S. firms during the time period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average of firm's daily CDS spreads within each calendar year. Rating is Moody's rating (Aaa+ rated bonds are assigned a value of23 and D rated bonds are assigned a value of 1). Lratio is leverage ratio, defined as long term debt to total assets. Return is stock return (daily CRSP returns during the calendar year), Equity standard deviation (Stddev) is calculated each year at the firm level from daily CRSP returns during the calendar year). Return on Assets (ROA) is net income divided by total assets. The variable ltotalassets is the logarithm of total assets. The variable bonus/total compensation is bonus divided by total compensation (sum of salary, bonus, other annual, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted, long term incenctive payouts (LTIP), and al other compensation). Equity/total compensation is the ratio of the sum of options, LTIP, and restricted shares) to total compensation.
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; standard errors in parentheses. 1 Panel regressions (OLS) with firm fixed effects.
All regressions include an intercept (not reported). Regressions iii, iv, v and vi include a "crisis" year dummy for 2008 and industry fixed effects (not reported); industry fixed effects are based on four digit-SIC codes following Fama and French (1997) . Coefficients from pooled regressions of annual CDS spreads on firm characteristics and CEO compensation for 22 German firms during the time period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average of firm's daily CDS spreads within each calendar year. Rating is Moody's rating (Aaa+ rated bonds are assigned a value of23 and D rated bonds are assigned a value of 1; if Moody's rating is missing, we replaced it with S&P credit rating in order to keep the sample). Lratio is leverage ratio, defined as long term debt to total assets. Return is stock return (daily returns during the calendar year), Equity standard deviation (Stddev) is calculated each year at the firm level from daily returns during the calendar year). Return on Assets (ROA) is net income divided by total assets. The variable ltotalassets is the logarithm of total assets. The variable bonus/total compensation is bonus divided by total compensation (sum of salary, bonus, other annual, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted, long term incenctive payouts (LTIP), and al other compensation). Equity/total compensation is the ratio of the sum of options, LTIP, and restricted shares) to total compensation.
